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Nous obtenons des règles de taxation sur la pollution qui tiennent
compte de l'argument sur la redistribution des rentes, du besoin d'éviter la pollution
transfrontalière, de la correction pour le volume insuffisant de l'output d'un
oligopole, et de la correction pour le manque de coordination entre les firmes
domestiques. Nous montrons que la libéralisation du commerce mondial n'entraîne
pas nécessairement une augmentation du niveau de pollution.
We derive emission tax rules that take into account (i) the rent-shifting
argument, (ii) the need to mitigate transboundary pollution, (iii) correction for
restrictive oligopoly output, and (iv) correction for domestic coordination of outputs.
We show that trade liberalization does not necessarily result in more pollution.
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1 Introduction
The on-going eorts of governments to achieve multilaral trade liber-
alization have not been universally welcome. Environmentalists often
express the fear that an increased volume of trade will lead to more pol-
lution and further degradation of natural resources such as forests and
waterways. Industrialists in advanced economies worry that, with the
reduction in taris, there will be increased competition from rms oper-
ating in less developed countries, where laxed environmental standards
imply that these rms incur relatively lower costs. Powerful pressure
groups in advanced economies often ask their governments to penalize
imports of goods originating from countries which have laxer environ-
mental or labour standards. Less developed countries have also been
accused of not enforcing environmental and labour standards, so as to
enable its local rms to achieved a \comparative advantage" in the global
market, and also to attract foreign capital. Some authors have expressed
the concern that there is a \race to the bottom", which would in the end
harm everyone. On the other hand, as put by Anderson (1995), \devel-
oping countries perceive the entwining of these social issues with trade
policy as a threat to both their sovereignty and their economies."
In this paper we consider a model of oligopolistic trade when gov-
ernments adopt policies that aect both trade and the environment. An
important feature of our model is the assumption that rms are not iden-
tical, and that governments can adopt discriminatory (i.e., rm-specic)
taxes or standards. While rm-specic taxes on outputs or on quanti-
ties exported (or imported) are not popular and not often encountered
in practice (partly because of international agreements or conventions,
such as the \Most Favoured Nation" principle), rm-specic taxes on
emissions seem to be gaining acceptance, because they are seen as mea-
sures to internalize environmental externalities which, by their nature,
are specic to a production environment.
Optimal Pigouvian taxes under oligopoly has been studied by Kat-
soulacos and Xepapadeas (1995) under the assumption that rms are
identical. They show that if the number of rms is exogenous, then the
optimal emission tax falls short of the marginal damage cost (because,
in the absence of externality, oligopoly output is below the socially e-
cient level). This result is an extension of the monopoly case
1
. On the
other hand, if the number of rms is endogenous and if there are xed
costs, they obtain the conclusion that the optimal Pigouvian tax could
exceed the marginal damage cost. In their model, euent fees serve to
1
For Pigouvian tax under monopoly, see Buchanan (1969) and Barnett (1980),
among others.
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\correct" outputs (and emissions) when there are two sources of market
failure: market power and environmental damages.
Matters become more complicated when the polluting oligopoly con-
sists of domestic rms producing in the home country and foreign ri-
vals producing in the foreign countries. From the publications by Ulph
(1992), Barrett (1994), Conrad (1996a, b), and Rauscher (1994, 1997),
four factors have been identied that aect deviations of optimal emis-
sion taxes from marginal damage costs
2
. Firstly, there is the rent shift-
ing argument: taxes can shift rents from foreign rms to domestic rms.
Secondly, one should not neglect the need to mitigate transboundary
pollution from foreign producers. Thirdly, output of an oligopoly tends
to be too low relative to consumer benets. Fourthly, when there are
several domestic rms, oligopolistic behaviour does not minimize the
production cost of a given volume of domestic output. In the literature,
specic models have developed models to address some of these issues,
but not all four issues simultaneously. Ulph (1996) has a model with the
rst three factors present but where there is one one rm in each country,
though these rms can have dierent costs. Barrett (1994) and Kennedy
(1995) allow for many rms in each country, but these rms are identi-
cal. A main contribution of our paper is that it integrates all the factors
within a model where rms are not identical. We consider the case where
rms are heterogeneous both in production costs, and in emission per
unit of output. We allow the governments to use rm-specic emission
taxes.
In Section 3, we consider the case where two governments set emis-
sion taxes non-cooperatively. We show that at the Nash equilibrium in
the game between the two governments, the rm-specic emission tax
rates on larger rms are smaller than average. If domestic rms are
identical and there is no pollution spillover, then the domestic emission
tax is greater [respectively, smaller] than the marginal environmental
damage provided that the number of domestic rms is suciently great
[respectively, small] relative to the number of foreign rms. However, if
foreign pollution has spillover eects on the home country, then domestic
emission tax may be smaller than the marginal environmental damage
even when the number of domestic rms is great.
In Section 4 we turn to the analysis of the eect of trade liberal-
ization on emission taxes. We assume that the foreign country imposes
no emission or trade taxes, while the home country initially imposes
both emission taxes and import taris. We examine whether a reduc-
tion in import taris (trade liberalisation) lead to lower emission taxes
2
See also the survey chapters by Ulph in Folmer and Tietenberg (1997/1998).
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and higher domestic emissions.We show that if the weight given to con-
sumers' surplus is zero, then under certain conditions, a partial trade
liberalization will lead to a countervailing reduction in emission taxes
that leave total emission in the home country unchanged. However, if
the weight given to consumers' surplus is suciently great, then a par-
tial trade liberalization will lead to signicant reductions in domestic
emission taxes, and more domestic emission.
2 A Model of Asymmetric Oligopoly
Consider an international Cournot oligopoly consisting of n non-identical
rms, of which m
H
are in the home country (country H), and m
F
are
in the foreign country (country F ). The rms produce a homogenous
good. Firms dier from each other in two respects: (a) production cost,
and (b) emission per unit of output. In each country, the government
sets emission tax rates that can be rm-specic.
Let x
i
denote rm i's output.The cost of producing x
i
is 
i
c(x
i
) where

i
> 0 is a parameter and c(:) is a convex and increasing function, with
c(0) = 0: Its emission of pollutant is e
i
= 
i
x
i
, where 
i
> 0 is rm-
specic constant. Firm i faces a rm-specic tax t
i
per unit of emission,
or, equivalently

i
= 
i
t
i
(1)
per unit of output. Here we assume that in each country the government
can charge discriminatory emission taxes.
The rms sell their output in the same market. (This market can be
an integrated world market, or the home country's market, or the foreign
country's market, or a market in a third country). LetH = f1; 2; :::; _m
H
g
and F = fm
H
+ 1; :::; ng. The demand function is represented by P =
P (X) where X = X
H
+X
F
and
X
H

X
h2H
x
h
; X
F

X
f2F
x
f
We assume that P
0
(X) < 0, P (0) > 0;and that there exists

X such that
P (

X) = 0: In addition, we will need the assumption that
(n+ 1)P
0
(X) +XP
00
(X) < 0 (2)
This condition is satised if the marginal revenue curve for the industry
has a negative slope.
3
3
For a complete set of assumptions that guarantees existence and uniqueness of
Cournot equilibrium, see Gaudet and Salant (1991). We will take it that they hold
in our model.
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The home country's welfare is the sum of the home consumers' sur-
plus, home producers' surplus, government's tax revenue, less pollution
damages.
We rst ask the following question: suppose that Country F has
set the emission tax rates (t
m
H
+1
; :::; t
n
), what is Country H 's best re-
sponses in terms of its own rm-specic emission taxes? To answer this
question, it is convenient to show that choosing home emission tax rates
are equivalent to choosing directly home rms' outputs, subject to the
constraints that rms' outputs are consistent with a Cournot equilib-
rium. To see this, let us begin with the rst order condition for rm
k:
P
0
(
^
X)x^
k
+ P (
^
X) = 
k
c
0
(x^
k
) + 
k
(3)
This equation determines a relationship
x^
k
= 
k
(
^
X; 
k
)  
k
(
^
X
F
+
^
X
H
; 
k
) (4)
that must hold between the industry's equilibrium output
^
X and rm k's
equilibrium output x^
k
. Note that 
kX
 @
k
(
^
X; 
k
)=@
^
X < 0 under the
assumption that P
00
(
^
X)x^
k
+P
0
(
^
X) < 0, and 
k
 @
k
(
^
X; 
k
)=@
k
< 0.
Thus the equilibrium output produced in country F is
^
X
F
=
X
f2F

f
(
^
X
F
+
^
X
H
; 
f
) (5)
This yields
^
X
F
=
^
X
F
(
^
X
H
; 
F
) (6)
where by denition 
F
 (
m
H
+1
; :::; 
n
), and where
@
^
X
F
@
^
X
H
=
P
f2F

fX
1 
P
f2F

fX
< 0 (7)
Equation (6) means that, given 
F
, if the home country can control the
aggregate output of the home oligopolists, then the aggregate output of
the foreign oligopolists is uniquely determined.
Since, in equilibrium,
^
X
H
+
^
X
F
=
^
X; it follows that
^
X =
^
X
H
+
^
X
F
(
^
X
H
; 
F
) =
^
X(
^
X
H
; 
F
) (8)
and
@
^
X
@
^
X
H
=
1
1 
P
f2F

fX
> 0
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To illustrate, consider the special case with a linear demand P (Q) =
A BQ, and quadratic costs 
k
c(x
k
) = (
k
=2)x
2
k
. Then in equilibrium
x^
f
= 
f
[(A  
f
) B
^
X
H
 B
^
X
F
] (9)
where 
f
 1=(B + 
f
). Let

F

1
m
F
X
f2F

f
(10)
Then
^
X
F
(
^
X
H
; 
F
) =
Am
F

F
1+Bm
F

F
 
P
f2F

f

f
1+Bm
F

F
 
Bm
F

F
1+Bm
F

F
^
X
H
(11)
and
^
X(
^
X
H
; 
F
) =
1
1+Bm
F

F
"
Am
F

F
 
X
f2F

f

f
+
^
X
H
#
(12)
Thus, for a given 
F
, the home government can choose
^
X
H
and the x^
h
,
h 2 H , and generate a Cournot equilibrium, supporting it by a suitably
chosen vector 
H
so that (3) is satised.
We now derive an expression for the welfare of the home country.
The aggregate emission by rms in country H is E
H
=
P
h2H

h
x
h
=
P
h2H
e
h
. Similarly, the aggregate emission by foreign rms is E
F
=
P
f2F

f
x
f
. Assume that the home country's valuation of total dam-
age is D(E
H
+ 
F
E
F
) where 
F
is the spillover coecient from foreign
pollution to the home country, 1  
F
 0. Let
^
X denote the Cournot
equilibrium output. Dene consumers' surplus as
S(
^
X) =
Z
^
X
0
P (X)dX  
^
XP (
^
X)
Social welfare in the home country is dened as a weighted sum of con-
sumers' surplus, home rms' prot, and government's revenue from emis-
sion taxes, less pollution damage (for the moment, we assume there are
no taris for simplicity)
^
W
H
= 
H
S(
^
X) +
X
h2H
^
h
+
X
h2H
t
h
e
h
 D
H
(E
H
+ 
F
E
F
) (13)
where ^
h
is rm h's equilibrium prot, and where 
H
 0 is the weight
given to consumers' surplus (
H
= 0 if the good is not sold in the home
market.)
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In what follows, we assume that D(:) is linear function, with D
0
H
=

H
> 0.Using the denition (1) and (3), we can express
^
W
H
(13) in a
Cournot equilibrium as
^
W
H
= 
H
^
S +
^
X
H
^
P  
X
h2H
 
h
(x^
h
)  
H

F
E
F
(14)
where
 
h
(x^
h
)  
H

h
x^
h
+ 
h
c(x^
h
)
where x^
h
is rm h's equilibrium output,
^
X is equilibrium industry output,
^
S = S(
^
X), and
^
P is the equilibrium price.
3 Non-cooperative Pigouvian Taxes
In this section, we seek answers to the following questions: (i) Given a
set of emission taxes imposed by a foreign country, what are the home
country's optimal emission taxes, under the assumption that the home
country cannot vary its trade taxes, and (ii) if both countries try to op-
timize (non-cooperatively) by setting rm-specic emission taxes, what
is the resulting Nash equilibrium?
We assume that the cost function c(x) is strictly convex. The fol-
lowing proposition characterize the optimal emission taxes in the home
country, for a given vector of emission taxes in the foreign country:
Proposition 3.1: (Optimal rm-specic Pigouvian taxes)
Given the foreign choice of 
F
, the optimal rm-specic Pigouvian
tax per unit of emission by rm h is given by
t
h
= 
H
+
1

h
[ 
^
P
0
]
^
X
H
" 
A
H
 

H
^
X
^
X
H
! 
@
^
X
@
^
X
H
!
 
x^
h
^
X
H
#
; for all h 2 H
(15)
where
^
X
H
is the home industry output, and
A
H
 1 +

H

F
[ P
0
]
^
X
H
X
f2F

f
@x^
f
@
^
X
(16)
Thus (i) t
h
is greater, the greater is the damage cost 
H
;(ii) t
h
is nega-
tively related to the weight 
H
attached to consumers' surplus, and (iii)
in equilibrium, among all rms that have the same 
h
, smaller rms pay
higher tax rates per unit of emission (This is because small rms are
those which have high 
h
, they are less ecient, and the optimal policy
seeks to reduce their outputs.)
6
Proof: See the Appendix.
Remark 3.1: Consider rst the case where 
H
= 0, that is, the
good is not sold in the home market. Proposition 3.1 indicates that
emission tax t
h
is equal to marginal environmental damage (
H
) plus an
adjustment factor. This factor is zero if the export price of the good,
^
P ,
is exogenous. In the case of an oligopoly,
^
P is not exogenous. If there is
no spillover from foreign pollution (i.e., if 
F
= 0) then A
H
= 1 and the
tax formula (15) becomes
t
h
= 
H
+
1

h
[ 
^
P
0
]
^
X
H
"
@
^
X
@
^
X
H
  s^
h
#
where s^
h
= x^
h
=
^
X
H
: Then t
h
is smaller than the damage cost 
H
if and
only if s^
h
> @
^
X=@
^
X
H
. If, in addition, all domestic rms are identical
(implying s^
h
= 1=m
H
) then t
h
is smaller than the marginal damage cost

H
if and only if the number of domestic rms is suciently small:
@
^
X
@
^
X
H
<
1
m
H
(17)
In this case the shortfall of t
h
over 
H
reects the desire of the home
government to expand domestic output so as to capture a bigger market
share. If 
F
= 0 and @
^
X=@
^
X
H
= 1=m
H
, then t
h
= 
H
Condition (17)
can also be expressed in terms of the slopes of foreign rms' reaction
functions
However, if spillover is present (i.e., 
F
> 0), and @x^
f
=@
^
X < 0 (see
Example 1 above) then A
H
< 1 and hence it is possible that t
h
< 
H
even if @
^
X=@
^
X
H
> 1=m
H
(i.e., even if the home rms are numerous).
The reason for this is as follows: by reducing emission tax rates below the
marginal environmental damage 
H
, the home country 's output
^
X
H
will
expand, and this will reduce foreign output and hence foreign emission
(which is harmful to the home country).
Remark 3.2: If 
H
> 0 (the good is sold in the home country) and
if 
F
= 0 (no spillover from foreign pollution) then (15) reduces to
t
h
= 
H
+
1

h
[ 
^
P
0
]
^
X
H
h
f1  [
H
^
X=
^
X
H
]g@
^
X=@
^
X
H
  s^
h
i
In particular, if there are no foreign rms, then rm h will be taxed at
a rate below the marginal damage 
H
if and only if its output share is
greater than 1  
H
.
We now turn to the task of characterizing a Nash equilibrium emis-
sion taxes when both countries try to maximize national welfare.
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Proposition 3.2: (Nash equilibrium rm-specic Pigouvian
taxes)
If both countries set rm-specic Pigouvian taxes in response to each
other, then the Nash equilibrium taxes in the game between the two
countries are given by
t
h
= 
H
+
1

h
[ P
0
]
^
X
H
" 
A
H
 

H
^
X
^
X
H
!
@X
@X
H
 
x^
h
^
X
H
#
for all h 2 H
(18)
and
t
f
= 
F
+
1

f
[ P
0
]
^
X
F
" 
A
F
 

F
^
X
^
X
F
!
@X
@X
H
 
x^
f
^
X
F
#
for all f 2 F (19)
where A
H
is given by (16) and A
F
is dened in a similar way.
Example 3.1
With linear demand P = 1 X and quadratic cost c(x) = (1=2)x
2
,
conditions (18) and (19) give

h
= a
h
+ b
h
^
X +
1
1  
h
X
f2F

f

f
; h 2 H (20)

f
= a
f
+ b
f
^
X +
1
1  
f
X
h2H

h

h
; f 2 F (21)
where
a
h

1
1  
h
2
4
(
h

H
  
h
) 
1
1 +m
F

F
X
f2F

f
(1 + 
F

H

f
)
3
5
; h 2 H
a
f

1
1  
f
"
(
f

F
  
f
) 
1
1 +m
H

H
X
h2H

h
(1 + 
H

F

h
)
#
; f 2 F
b
h

1
1  
h


h
+
1  
H
+m
F

F
1 +m
F

F

; h 2 H
b
f

1
1  
f


f
+
1  
F
+m
H

H
1 +m
H

H

; f 2 F

h


h
1 +m
F

F
; h 2 H

f


f
1 +m
H

H
; f 2 F
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Furthermore, recall that from (11)
^
X
F
=
X
f2F

f
(1  
f
) m
F

F
^
X
and similarly
^
X
H
=
X
h2H

h
(1  
h
) m
H

H
^
X
Hence the equilibrium output is
^
X =
1
1 +m
F

F
+m
H

H
2
4
X
f2F

f
(1  
f
) +
X
h2H

h
(1  
h
)
3
5
(22)
Substituting (22) into (20) and (21) we obtain n linear equations in 
h
and 
f
, and the Nash equilibrium taxes are uniquely determined.
4 Eects of Trade Liberalization on the En-
vironment
In this section, we examine the eects of trade liberalization on the
quality of the environment under the assumptions that the polluting
industry is an international oligopoly, and that the home government
can adjust emission taxes in response to a required reduction in tari
rates (demanded by an international body, such as the World Trade
Organization).
We use the model developed in the preceding section, and consider
the case where the goods are sold only in the home market. We assume
that the foreign government does not impose any tax (nor subsidy) on
output (nor on emissions). The home country already has in place a
set of import taris on the good produced by the foreign oligopolists.
We assume that these tari rates are exogenously set
4
(for example they
might be controlled by international bodies such as the World Trade
Organization). Given these tari rates, the home government has as
policy instruments rm-specic emission taxes on home rms. These
instruments are optimally set to maximize home welfare. We seek the
4
The case where the tari rates are not exogenously set is considered briey in
the Appendix. There, we show that even if tari rates are optimally set, the optimal
emission taxes still deviate from the marginal damage cost. This is because, of the
four factors mentioned in the introduction, taris deal only with the rst two.
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answers to the following questions: suppose that due to a new inter-
national agreement, all import taris must be cut by a given amount,
how would the home government adjust its emission taxes? Would the
adjustment result in a lower quality of the environment?
The home welfare function is the sum ofW
H
dened in the preceding
section, and tari revenue:
W
0
H
=W
H
+
X
f2F
T
f
x
f
where T
f
is the import tari on foreign rm f 's good. (Here, we allow
rm-specic tari, but the special case where all T
f
are required to be
identical is admitted.)
The relationship between the Cournot equilibrium industry output
^
X and rm f 's equilibrium output is x^
f
= x^
f
(
^
X;T
f
), where T
f
now
takes the place of 
f
. It is convenient to dene 
f
(T
f
) as follows

F

H

f
(T
f
) = 
F

H

f
  T
f
(23)
Then we obtain
W
0
H
= X
H
^
P + 
H
^
S  
X
h2H
 
h
(x^
h
)  
F

H
X
f2F

f
x^
f
and we can apply the analysis of the problem of maximizing W
H
in the
previous section to the problem of maximizing W
0
H
of this section. We
thus obtain the following optimal emission tax formulas, for exogenously
given tari rates T
f
:
t
h
= 
H
+
1

h
[ 
^
P
0
]
^
X
H
" 

A
H
 

H
^
X
^
X
H
! 
@
^
X
@
^
X
H
!
 
x^
h
^
X
H
#
(24)
where

A
H
 1 +

F

H
[ 
^
P
0
]
^
X
H
X
f2F

f
@x^
f
@
^
X
We are now ready to determine whether an exogenous reduction in
the import tari rates (i.e., a marginal trade liberalization) would lead
to a reduction in emission taxes. To simplify computation, we specialize
in the case where the demand function is linear and the cost function
c(x) is quadratic. Then we obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 4.1:
(i) If the weight given to consumers' surplus is zero (
H
= 0), then,
with linear demand and quadratic cost, a partial trade liberalization (i.e.,
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a reduction, but not necessarily elimination, of all taris) would lead to
a reduction in emission taxes in the home country. However, the output
(and hence emission) of each home rm will remain unchanged. As a
result, foreign output and pollution will rise.
(ii) If the weight given to consumers' surplus is positive (
H
> 0),
then, with linear demand and quadratic cost, a partial trade liberaliza-
tion would lead to (a) a reduction in emission taxes in the home country,
and (b) an increase in the output (and emission) of each domestic rm.
Proof: See the Appendix
Part (i) of Proposition 4.1 shows that the claim made by some envi-
ronmentalists that trade liberalization would lead to more pollution in
the home country is not always correct. This result is rather special,
and one may suspect that it depends on the assumption that pollution
is directly proportional to output. If there is scope for abatement ac-
tivities, the equivalence between an emission tax and an output tax is
broken, and thus when emission taxes are reduced to oset the impact
on domestic output of a lowering of import taris, the level of domestic
emission may rise.
5 Concluding Remarks:
In this paper, we studied the properties of equilibrium Pigouvian taxes
when these have impacts on international trade. The rm-specic op-
timal emission taxes were derived. These taxes were shown to exceed
or fall short of the marginal environmental damages, depending on the
numbers of home and foreign rms, and on their cost characteristics.We
also showed that trade liberalization need not always result in a more
polluted environment.
One aspect of pollution reduction that we did not deal with in this
paper is the re-location of plants. This is the subject matter of a com-
panion paper. We have also assumed that pollution is a ow rather than
a stock which evolves over time. Designing emission taxes for pollut-
ing oligopolists in a model with accumulation of the pollution stock has
been studied by Benchekroun and Long (1998) in the context of a closed
economy. It would seem worthwhile to extend their model to the case of
an international oligopoly
11
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3.1
^
W
H
can be expressed as
^
W
H
= 
H
S(
^
X) +
^
X
H
^
P  
X
h2H
 
h
(x^
h
)  
F

H
X
f2F

f
x^
f
(25)
Since x^
f
= 
f
(
^
X; 
f
) for all foreign rms, and Country H seeks to
maximize (25) by choosing rm-specic emission tax t
h
= 
h
=
h
(h =
1; :::;m
H
); given the foreign vector 
F
. In view of (3), (6), and (8),
this maximization problem is equivalent to maximizing (25) by choosing
directly both the home industry output
^
X
H
, and the vector (x^
1
; :::; x^
m
H
)
of outputs of the home rms, subject to the constraint
X
h2H
x^
h
=
^
X
H
(26)
(Afterwards, we can infer the emission taxes from (3).) It is convenient
to solve this problem in two steps. In the rst step, we take
^
X
H
as
given, (and hence
^
X and
^
P as given), and maximize with respect to
(x^
1
; :::; x^
m
H
); subject to (26). In the second step, we choose
^
X
H
.
The rst step:
For a given
^
X
H
, maximization of (25) subject to (26) involves setting
up the Lagrangian
L
H
= G(
^
X
H
; 
H
) +
X
h2H
[
H
x^
h
   
h
(x^
h
)] (27)
where
G(
^
X
H
; 
H
)  
H
S(
^
X) + f
^
P   
H
g
^
X
H
  
F

H
X
f2F

f
x^
f
(
^
X; 
f
) (28)
Dierentiating with respect to x^
h
; we obtain the rst order conditions
which say that the full marginal cost of output (production cost plus
environmental damage) must be equalized across all home rms:

H

h
+ 
h
c
0
(x^
h
) = 
H
(29)
or
x^
h
= c
0 1


H
  
H

h

h

(30)
This implies that among rms with identical 
h
, rms with high 
i
produce less. From (30) we get
x^
h
= x^
h
(
H
) (31)
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Summing (31) over all all h 2 H , we get
X
h2H
x^
h
(
H
) =
^
X
H
(32)
Since x^
h
(
H
) is strictly increasing in 
H
, equation (32) uniquely deter-
mines the optimal 
H
, for given
^
X
H
:
^

H
=
^

H
(
^
X
H
).
To illustrate our approach, consider the following example:
Example
With linear demand P = 1 Q and quadratic cost 
i
c(x
i
) = (
i
=2)x
2
i
,
we get
x^
h
(
H
) =
[
H
  
H

h
]

h
and hence (32) gives
^

H
= v
H

H
+ v
H
^
X
H
where 
H
 
H
P
h2H
[
h
=
h
] and v
H
 1=
P
h2H
[1=
h
]. (End of ex-
ample)
The second step
We now determine the optimal
^
X
H
. We follow the duality meth-
ods used in Rockafellar (1970)
5
. Following Rockafellar, we dene the
conjugate functions
 

h
(
H
)  max
x
h
f
H
x^
h
   
h
(x^
h
)g
then, for a given
^
X
H
, the value of the Lagrangian
^
L (optimized with
respect to the x^
h
's) is
^
L = 
H
S(
^
X) +
^
X
H
fP (
^
X) 
^

H
(
^
X
H
)g+
X
h2H
 

h
(
^

H
(
^
X
H
))  
F

H
X
f2F

f
x^
f
(
^
X; 
f
) (33)
Here,
^
L depends only on
^
X
H
(to be chosen in the second step) and on
the foreign tax vector 
F
chosen by the foreign government.
We now dierentiate (33) with respect to
^
X
H
and equate it to zero:
[
^
P
0
]f
^
X
H
 
H
^
Xg
@
^
X
@
^
X
H
+
^
P 
^

H
(
^
X
H
) 
F

H
X
f2F

f
@x^
f
@
^
X
@
^
X
@
^
X
H
= 0 (34)
5
See Rockafellar (1970, Theorem 28.4 and Corollary 28.4.1., pp 284-5); see also
Luenberger (1969, Theorem 1, p. 224)
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(in deriving this equation, we have used the facts that
d 

h
d
H
= x^
h
). If
^
L(
^
X
H
) is concave and the solution is interior, then equation (34) deter-
mines country H 's unique optimal choice of
^
X
H
for given 
F
:
From the equilibrium condition for rm h (see (3) and (1)), we have

h
t
h
= x^
h
^
P
0
+
^
P  
h
c
0
(x^
h
) and using (29), we get 
h
t
h
= x^
h
^
P
0
+
H

h
+
[
^
P   
H
_
]: Use (34) to substitute for [
^
P   
H
]:2
Proof of Proposition 4.1
We make use of (9) to (12), with A = B = 1 for simplicity, where 
f
is
now replaced by the tari T
f
imposed by country H on goods imported
from country F . We have
x^
f
= 
f
[(1  T
f
) 
^
X]
^
X
F
=  m
F

F
^
X +
X
f2F

f
(1  T
f
) 
^
X
F
(
^
X;T
F
)
where 
F
 (1=m
F
)
P
f2F

f
; and, since in equilibrium
^
X
H
=
^
X  
^
X
F
(
^
X;T
F
); we must have
^
X
H
= (1 +m
F

F
)
^
X  
X
f2F

f
(1  T
f
)  J
^
X  K (35)
where J = 1 +m
F

F
and K =
P
f2F

f
(1  T
f
). Hence
@
^
X
H
@
^
X
= 1 +m
F

F
 J
Recall that the rst order condition of the maximization of Lwith respect
to x
h
; where h 2 H; is
x^
h
=

H
  
H

h

h
(36)
or
x^
h
= [a
h

H
  
H
b
h
] ; h 2 H (37)
where a
h
 1=
h
and b
h
 
h
=
h
. Summing over all h 2 H yields
^
X
H
= m
H
a
H

H
 m
H
b
h

H
(38)
where a
H
 (1=m
H
)
P
h2H
a
h
and b
H
 (1=m
H
)
P
h2H
b
h
: Finally, from
(34)
P (X)  
H
=
^
X
H
  
H
^
X   
F
P
f2F

f

f
J
(39)
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The three equations (35),(38), and (39) determine 
H
;
^
X; and
^
X
H
:
Solving for 
H
:

H
=
J
2
 KJ + 2Jm
H
b
H
+ 
H
K + 
F

H
J
P
f2F

f

f
[2J   
H
]m
H
a
H
+ J
2
(40)
Now let trade liberalization be represented by a small reduction in all
T
f
. Write T
f
= T
0
f
  u. Then, from (40), and recalling that K and 
f
are functions of the T
f
's, the eect of a marginal trade liberalization on

H
is
@
H
@u
=

H

F
m
F
[2J   
H
]m
H
a
H
+ J
2
 0 (41)
(where we assume 2  
H
) and hence, using (37)
@x^
h
@u
=
a
h

H

F
m
F
[2J   
H
]m
H
a
H
+ J
2
 0 (42)
and thus the total domestic emission increases:
@E
H
@u
=

H

F
m
F
[2J   
H
]m
H
a
H
+ J
2
X
h2H

h
a
h
Also,
@
^
X
H
@u
=
m
F
a
H

H

F
[2J   
H
]m
H
a
H
J + J
2
 0
From (35)
^
X = (K +
^
X
H
)=J , hence
@
^
X
@u
=
1
J


F
m
F
+
m
F
a
F

H

F
[2J   
H
]m
F
a
F
+ J
2

> 0
Now, the equilibrium condition for home rms is

h
t
h
= x^
h
P
0
+ P (
^
X)  
h
c
0
(x^
h
)
therefore

h
@t
h
@u
=  
@x^
h
@u
 
@
^
X
@u
  (
h
)
@x^
h
@u
< 0
Optimal taris and optimal emission taxes:
In Section 4, it was assumed that the tari rates are exogenously set.
We now modify the model by allowing for the choice of tari rates. We
wish to nd out whether the optimal emission taxes still deviate from
marginal damage cost when taris are optimally chosen. Maximizing
W
0
H
with respect to the tari rates T
f
, f 2 F , and bearing in mind
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(23), we obtain m
F
equations that determine the optimal rm-specic
tari rates, for a given
^
X
H
[
^
P
0
]f
^
X
H
  
H
^
Xg
@
^
X
@T
f
+ x^
f
  
F

H
X
j2F

j
@x^
j
@
^
X
@
^
X
@T
f
= 0; f 2 F (43)
The optimal choice of
^
X
H
must satisfy a condition similar to(34):
[
^
P
0
]f
^
X
H
 
H
^
Xg
@
^
X
@
^
X
H
+
^
P  
^

H
(
^
X
H
) 
F

H
X
j2F

j
@x^
j
@
^
X
@
^
X
@
^
X
H
= 0 (44)
To illustrate, consider the special case where there is only one foreign
rm, and the inverse demand function is P = 1 X; and the cost function
is 
f
c(x
f
) = (
f
=2)x
2
f
; with 
f
= 1, so that 
f
= 1=2. Assume 
H
= 1.
Then (43) gives
T
f
  
F

H

f
=
1

f
x^
f
=
1
1 + 
f
h
1  T
f
 
^
X
H
i
(45)
Hence
T
f
=

f
2 + 
f


F

H
+


f
1 + 
f


1 
^
X
H


(46)
which is positive since
^
X
H
 X  1 given that P = 1 X  0. Finally,
substituting (46) into (24), we obtain the optimal emission taxes:
t
h
= 
H
 
x^
h

h
< 
H
This shows that under linear demand and quadratic costs, when the tari
rates are optimally chosen, the optimal emission taxes will fall short of
the marginal damage cost.
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